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THE EFFECT OF A NARROW APPLICATION
OF THE MID WEST PIPING DOCTRINE ON
EMPLOYEES' SECTION 7 RIGHTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE 1995 NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION LABOR
DISPUTE
INTRODUCTION
An employer's ability to exert a strong influence on employee free
choice in the collective bargaining process directly conflicts with the
objectives of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act).'
* The author wishes to thank Professor Neil N. Bernstein for his input and guidance
with this Note.
I National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)). For a general discussion of the history and
evolution of the NLRA, see WALTER E. OBERER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR
LAW 108-180 (4th ed. 1994). The sections of the NLRA cited in this Note refer to the NLRA in
its current form.
One of the fundamental goals of the NLRA is to prevent conduct that has the "effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 151. Section 1 of the Act notes:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours,
or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
Washington University Open Scholarship
304 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
One of the primary goals of the NLRA is to ensure equality of
bargaining power between employees and employers.2 The core of
the NLRA is section 7,3 which protects the freedom of employees to
self-organize and select collective bargaining representatives.'
In an effort to protect employee section 7 rights, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board)5 held in Midwest Piping
& Supply Co.6 that an employer has a duty of strict neutrality in
recognitional labor disputes. Recognitional labor disputes involve
conflicts over which union should represent employees in a particular
bargaining unit.' Under the duty of strict neutrality articulated in
Id. (emphasis added).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
3. Section 7 of the Act provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in [§ 8(a)(5)] of this title.
Id § 157.
This Note will refer to employees' § 7 rights and the right of employees to freely choose
bargaining representatives interchangeably.
4. There are two main enforcement provisions in § 7. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section [7]." Id. § 158(a)(1). In addition, § 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer.
mo dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to
rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section [6] of this
title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with
him during working hours without loss of time or pay.
Id. § 158(a)(2).
5. The NLRB is the administrative agency created by the NLRA to enforce employee § 7
rights. See 1 PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28-29 (3d ed. 1992).
6. 63 N.L.tRB. 1060 (1945).
7. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1070. See infra Part L.A (discussing Midwest Piping).
S. See infra Part I for discussion of various recognitional dispute scenarios.
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Midwest Piping,9 an employer had an obligation to refrain from
negotiating with any union when a "real question concerning
representation"'" of its employees existed." In RCA Del Caribe,
Inc., 2 Bruckner Nursing Home, 3 and Dresser Industries, Inc.,4
however, the Board narrowed the scope of the Midwest Piping
doctrine by limiting the employers' duty to remain neutral when a
question arose as to the employees' choice of bargaining
representative.'5
This Note examines the impact of the Board's narrowing of the
Midwest Piping doctrine on the rights of employees to choose
bargaining representatives without employer manipulation.16 In June
9. After its decision in Midwest Piping, the Board and the courts referred to employers'
duty of strict neutrality as the Midwest Piping doctrine. See infra Part I. This Note will refer to
an employer's duty of strict neutrality and the Midwest Piping doctrine interchangeably.
10. Both the NLRB and the courts have struggled with the formulation of a standard for
determining what constituted a real question concerning representation. The Board has
fluctuated between a broad and narrow interpretation of the question concerning representation
standard while the circuit courts have consistently preferred a narrow approach. See infra Part I
(discussing the Board and the courts' approach to the question concerning representation
standard). This Note utilizes the terms "real question concerning representation," "question
concerning representation," and "question of representation" interchangeably.
11. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1069-70.
12. 262 N.L.R.B. 963 (1982).
13. 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982).
14. 264 N.L.R.B. 1088 (1982).
15. All three cases altered an employer's duty under the Midwest Piping doctrine but each
case addressed the issue under different scenarios. See infra Part I (discussing RCA Del Caribe,
Bruckner Nursing Home, and Dresser Industries).
16. When the Board first issued its rulings in RCA Del Caribe and Bruckner Nursing
Home, several commentators criticized the Board's position. Commentators predicted that the
Board's decisions in RCA Del Caribe and Bruckner Nursing Home would seriously undermine
the right of employees to freely choose bargaining representatives. See, e.g., Beth Z. Margulies,
Employees' Pipe Dream of Free Choice in Representation: Effectuated or Eradicated? (The
Midwest Piping Doctrine Reyised), 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 75, 88-103 (1983) (arguing that
Bruckner Nursing Home and RCA Del Caribe fail to adequately protect employee free choice);
Bruce C. Herron, Comment, The NLRB Modification of the Midwest Piping Doctrine:
Industrial Stability v. Employee Free Choice, 88 DICK. L. REv. 129, 132 (1983) (stating that
RCA Del Caribe "infring(es] upon the right of employees to choose their collective bargaining
representative unfettered by employer interference"); Arthur J. Laplante, Comment, The
Midwest Piping Doctrine Redefined: A Matter of Policy, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 965, 967 (1983)
(noting that the Board's decision in RCA Del Caribe "is no more than another vehicle for
1997]
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of 1995, the National Basketball Association (NBA) players, team
owners, and the National Basketball Players Association (Players
Association) 7 engaged in a complex labor dispute that lasted through
September of 1995.' s The crux of the dispute concerned the
negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement between the
team owners and the players, and a movement by the players to
decertify 9 their union.2° The Board's narrow interpretation of the
Midwest Piping doctrine allowed team owners to control which labor
organization represented their employees by manipulating the terms
of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
Part I of the Note examines the history and evolution of the
Midwest Piping doctrine. Part II presents the facts of the NBA labor
dispute and illustrates how the NBA and the team owners
enabling employer determination of the employees' bargaining representative"). See also
Timothy Silverman, Comment, The Effect of a Petition for Decertification on the Bargaining
Process: The Reversal of Dresser Industries, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 581, 608 (1988)
(concluding that the Board's decision in Dresser Industries that permits bargaining after the
filing of a decertification petition may be a "barrier to the ultimate goal of resolution of the
representation question and employee free choice of representation").
17. The Players Association was the union that represented the NBA players.
18. See infra Part I for an analysis of the NBA labor dispute.
19. To decertify a union, an employee or several employees, represented by at least 30%
of the employees in the particular bargaining unit, must present the Board with a decertification
petition. See 1 HARDIN, supra note 5, at 378. Section 9(e)(l) of the Act allows employees to
decertify their union. Section 9(e)(1) of the NLRA states that:
Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of the employees in a
bargaining unit covered by an agreement between their employer and a labor
organization made pursuant to [section 8(a)(3)] .. ., of a petition alleging they desire
that such authority be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret ballot of the employees
in such unit and certify the results thereof to such labor organization and to the
employer.
29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1). See also ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 49-50 (1976) (discussing the decertification
procedure). A decertification petition states that the employees in the bargaining unit no longer
wish to be represented by their union. See 1 HARDIN, supra note 5, at 379-80. If a majority of
the employees vote to decertify the union in a decertification election, the union is no longer the
bargaining representative of the employees. See OBERER, supra note 1, at 228-30. A
decertification proceeding is unnecessary, however, if a union admits that it no longer has the
majority support of its members. See 1 HARDIN, supra note 5, at 386-88.
20. See infra Part II (discussing and analyzing the NBA labor dispute).
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manipulated the players' choice of bargaining representative. 2'
Finally, Part III proposes that in light of the NBA labor dispute, the
Board should revert back to a broad application of the Midwest
Piping doctrine to ensure employee free choice in selecting labor
representatives.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE MIDWEST PIPING
DOCTRINE
A. Midwest Piping: The Creation of the Duty of Strict Neutrality
In Midwest Piping, the employer and the International Association
of Steam and Gas Fitters (Steamfitters) entered into a "members
only"' 2 contract.2 3 A rival union, the United Steelworkers of America
(Steelworkers), petitioned the Board for a representation election.24
Subsequently, the Steamfitters presented the employer with
authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees.' The
employer then entered into a union shop contract26 with the
21. This Note does not address whether multi-million dollar professional athletes require
union representation. For purposes of this Note, athletes are presumed to possess the same
rights and protections under the NLRA as do other employees. Furthermore, the objective facts
of the NBA labor dispute provide a worthwhile example of the problems that arise when the
Board employs a narrow scope the Midwest Piping doctrine.
22. A "members only" contract is when the employer and the union agree that the terms of
the contract only apply to employees who are members of the union. See Gardner Mechanical
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 89 F.3d 586, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1996). Employees who do not wish to join
the union are not governed by the contract. Id.
23. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1065. For a further in-depth discussion and analysis of
the seminal cases involved in the following discussion of the evolution of the Midwest Piping
doctrine, see Margulies, supra note 16; Herron, supra note 16; Laplante, supra note 16. See
also I HARDIN, supra note 5, at 310-17.
24. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1068-69. The Steamfitters also campaigned for
representation. Id. at 1070.
25. Id. at 1069.
26. Id. A union shop contract is an agreement between an employer and a union under
which employees may be required to "obtain and maintain membership in a union" and may be
discharged for dropping union membership. See 2 HARDIN, supra note 5, at 1495-1505;
GORMAN, supra note 19, at 642.
The NLRA explicitly permits employers and unions to enter into union shop agreements.
Section 8(aX3) specifically exempts union shop agreements from employer conduct that
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Steamfitters. 27
The Board held that the employer violated section 8(a)(2)28 of the
NLRA by recognizing the Steamfitters as the employees' bargaining
representative at a time when a real question concerning
representation existed.29 The Board found that the employer's
conduct constituted a breach of its duty to remain neutral when
confronted with opposing claims of representation by rival unions.3"
Accordingly, the Board held that by entering into an agreement with
the Steamfitters, the employer infringed upon the employees' right to
choose their bargaining representative without employer
interference.3'
The Board reasoned that Congress delegated the power to resolve
representation questions to the NLRB and, in the situation at hand,
the employer inappropriately determined the issue on its own.32
Furthermore, the Board noted that the employer infringed upon the
employees' section 7 rights because, by entering into a bargaining
agreement with the Steamfitters, the employer signaled to the
constitutes unfair labor practices:
[N]othing in this subchapter... shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action
defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning
of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, which is the later ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
Likewise, the NLRA provision governing labor organization unfair labor practices exempts
union shop agreements by allowing unions to deny or terminate membership based on the
"failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership." Id. § 158(b)(2).
27. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.R.B. at 1069.
28. See supra note 4 (discussing § 8(a)(2) of the Act).
29. Midwest Piping, 63 N.L.1.B. at 1070. Specifically, the Board stated that its ruling was
in response to the fact that the employer's acts "contravene[d] the letter and the spirit of the Act,
and le[d] to those very labor disputes affecting commerce which the Board's administrative
procedure is designed to prevent." Id. at 1070.
30. Id.
31. Id.at 1071.
32. Id. at 1070.
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employees that it supported the Steamfitters and not the
Steelworkers.33
B. The NLRB Expands the Scope of the Midwest Piping Doctrine and
the Courts Respond
The Board expanded the Midwest Piping doctrine in Shea
Chemical Corp.34 In Shea Chemical, the Board held that the
33. Id The Board stated that by signing a contract with the Steamfitters when the
Steelworkers filed for an election, the employer "indicated its approval of the Steamfitters,
accorded it unwarranted prestige, encouraged membership therein, discouraged membership in
the Steelworkers, and thereby rendered unlawful assistance to the Steamfitters, which interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act." Id. at 1071.
The Board included a third rationale for its decision when it expressed its dislike for
"membership" or "authorization" cards. The Board stated that:
Under the circumstances, we do not regard such proof [possession of signed
membership cards from a majority of the bargaining unit] as conclusive. Among other
things, it is well known that membership cards obtained during the heat of rival
organizing campaigns like those of the respondent's plants, do not necessarily reflect
the ultimate choice of a bargaining representative; indeed, the extent of dual
membership among the employees during periods of intense organizing activity is an
important unknown factor affecting a determination of majority status, which can best
be resolved by a secret ballot among the employees.
Id. at 1070 n.13.
34. Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1958). Shea Chemical involved a
dispute between the Mine Workers Union (Mine Workers) and the Oil Workers Union (Oil
Workers) over which union would represent the employees. Id. at 1027-28. After the Mine
Workers acquired authorization cards from a majority of the employees, the employer
recognized the Mine Workers as the employees' bargaining representative. Id. at 1027. The Oil
Workers subsequently informed the employer that a majority of employees supported it as their
bargaining representative, but the employer nevertheless refused to bargain with the Oil
Workers. Id. at 1028. The Oil Workers then filed a representation petition with the NLRB. Id.
The Oil Workers also filed §§ 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice charges against the
employer. Id. at 1027.
Shea Chemical overruled the Board's holding in William D. Gibson Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 660
(1954). In William D. Gibson, the Board held that an employer was permitted to continue
negotiating with an incumbent union until the Board certified the rival union as the employees'
collective bargaining representative. Id at 662-63. The incumbent Steelworkers Union and the
employer began negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. Id, at 661-62. The
Machinists Union filed a representation petition and requested that the employer recognize it as
the bargaining representative for 30 of the employees, but the employer refused. Id. In response,
the Machinists Union and filed §§ 8(aX1), 8(a)(2), and 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice charges
against the employer. Id. at 661-62. The Board dismissed the charges, holding that the Midwest
1997]
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employer committed an unfair labor practice3" by entering into a
collective bargaining agreement with a union that it had previously
recognized.36 Additionally, in an attempt to define what constituted a
real question concerning representation, the Board in Shea Chemical
recognized that an employer's duty of strict neutrality did not arise in
situations that involved a contract bar,37 a certification bar,38 or an
inappropriate bargaining unit.39
The Board, however, never established exactly how much
Piping doctrine did not apply in situations where an employer contracted with an incumbent
union that legitimately represented the employees. Id. at 662. The Board reasoned that the
policy conformed to the primary objectives of the Act: stability in labor relations and continuity
in collective bargaining. Id. at 661-62.
The courts agreed with the rationale of the Board in William D. Gibson. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that employer's continued
negotiations with long-time incumbent union after competing union filed election petition did
not violate the Act); Modine Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding
that employer's continued bargaining with initial union instead of rival union did not violate the
Act where the first union represented a large, uncoerced majority and the rival union adherents
rescinded their authorization cards); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147, 155-56 (6th
Cir. 1969) (holding that employer did not breach its neutrality by recognizing a rival union
which manifested a clear majority of employees over competing union); NLRB v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1954) (holding that employer's recognition of
union which demonstrated clear majority support over competing union did not constitute
unfair labor practice).
35. Specifically, violations of§§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2). Shea Chem., 121 N.L.R.B. at 1029.
36. Id at 1028-29.
37. Id. at 1029. A "contract bar" is when the Board denies an election among employees
who are covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement. GORMAN, supra note 19, at 54.
The collective bargaining agreement must be in writing, properly signed (before the petition of
the rival union is filed), and must be for a definite duration of up to three years. Id. at 54-55. See
General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1125 (1962) (extending the contract bar period from
two to three years).
38. Shea Chem., 121 N.L.RB. at 1029. A "certification bar" is a one-year ban on the
filing of representation petitions after the Board certifies a union as the bargaining
representative of a group of employees. I HARDIN, supra note 5, at 390.
39. Shea Chem., 121 N.L.R.B. at 1029. The Board considers several factors in deciding
whether a union represents an "appropriate bargaining unit." The Board examines, among other
things, the amount and manner in which the employees are paid, the type of benefits the
employees receive, the number of hours the employees work, the type of work the employees
perform, the employees' skills, training and qualifications, the amount of contact the employees
have with each other, and the bargaining history of the employees. Kalamazoo Paper Box
Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962).
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employee support a rival union needed to raise a question concerning
representation and an employer's duty of strict neutrality.4" Indeed,
the Board created a broad and ambiguous standard. For example, in
Playskool, Inc.,4" the Board held that a rival union's claim that was
not "clearly unsupportable and lacking in substance" raised a
question concerning representation.42
Contrary to the Board's broad standard for determining when a
real question of representation existed, the circuit courts held that if
any one of a number of unions demonstrated majority support of the
employees, a question of representation did not arise.4 3 Accordingly,
40. 1 HAPDN,supra note 5, at312.
41. 195 N.L.R.B. 560 (1972), enforcement denied, 477 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1973). In
Playskool, the Board found that the employer violated §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), and 8(a)(3) of the Act
when the employer recognized and bargained with an incumbent union at a time when a rival
union also claimed that it represented the employees. Id. at 561.
42. Id. at 560. Indeed, the Board gave this standard much leeway. In American Bread Co.,
170 N.L.RB. 85 (1968), enforcement denied, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969), the Board held that
the employer committed §§ 8(aXI) and 8(a)(2) unfair labor practices by bargaining with one
union when a rival union filed a representation petition with the support of only one (out of 92)
authorization card. Id. at 88. The Board reasoned that the number of employees signing
authorization cards "should be of no concern to an employer when a claim is made." Id. But see
Robert Hall Gentilly Rd. Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 692, 693 (1973) (holding that the union's
possession of 24 out of 153 authorization cards in the bargaining unit did not raise a question
concerning representation when the union withdrew its representation petition from the NLRB).
43. As stated by the Third Circuit:
[Wihere a clear majority of the employees, without subjection to coercion or other
unlawful influence, have made manifest their desire to be represented by a particular
union, there is no factual basis for a contention that the employer's action thereafter in
recognizing the union or contracting with it is an interference with their freedom of
choice.
NLRB v. Air Master Corp., 339 F.2d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 1964) (citations omitted). See also
citations in I HARDIN, supra note 5, at 314 n. 138 (citing NLRB v. Newport Div. of Wintex
Knitting Mills, Inc., 610 F.2d 430, 431 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that no real question of
representation existed when one of two rival unions convincingly demonstrated its majority
status without any help from the employer by obtaining authorization cards from 96 of the 135
employees); Buck Knives, Inc. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that
employer's recognition of one of two unions vying for sole recognition on basis of a 170 to 108
employee vote for recognized union was not a violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2)); NLRB v.
Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that employer's
recognition of union was not a violation of Act where recognized union represented employees
in six other hotels operated by employer and had clear majority support of new employees);
Suburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 499 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1974); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 477
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a majority of the circuit courts disagreed with and did not enforce the
Board's findings of employer unfair labor practices when the
employer recognized and bargained with a union that obtained
majority support of the employees in the bargaining unit.'
The courts based their theory on the need to further the Act's goal
of maintaining continuity in the collective bargaining process
between an employer and the incumbent union.45 Moreover, the
courts reasoned that in situations where a union demonstrated
majority support, the employer fulfilled its duty to the employees by
bargaining with their chosen representative.46 In addition, the courts
believed that an employer's act of bargaining with the union under
such circumstances did not interfere with the rights of the rival
union.47 Accordingly, the circuit courts noted that their rule protected
the section 7 rights of the employees by permitting the employer and
the union to bargain without "undue delay." ' 8 Also, the courts
explained that this policy promoted the Act's goal of labor "peace"' 9
F.2d 66, 72-3 (7th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1972);
Modine Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1971); American Bread Co. v. NLRB,
411 F.2d 147, 156 (6th Cir. 1969); District 50, United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565,
570 (4th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir.
1954)).
44. See supra note 43. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Board's approach. See Oil
Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 664, 665 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that "where there are
competing unions and 'the situation [has] not crystallized,' [the employer is obligated] not to
exert influence thereby tipping the scales and 'depriving the employees of their right to select
their representative in a free contest between the rival organizations."' (quoting NLRB v. Signal
Oil & Gas Co., 303 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1962))). See I HARDIN, supra note 5, at 314.
45. See, e.g., Playskool, 477 F.2d at 70. Commentators have recognized that Playskool
presents a good example of the circuit courts position. See, e.g., Herron, supra note 16, at 136-
37; Laplante, supra note 16, at 977-8 1.
46. See, e.g., Playskool, 477 F.2d at 70 (citing Indianapolis Newspapers, 210 F.2d at 503).
47. See, e.g., id.
48. See, e.g., id. In Playskool, the court noted the alternate approaches taken by the courts
and the Board. The court recognized that whereas the Board looks to whether the minority
union's claim is "not clearly unsupportable" in determining whether a question concerning
representation exists, the courts look to whether the union claiming majority support actually
has the uncoerced support of a majority of the employees. Id. at 70 n.3.
49. Id. at 70. See also NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d at 702; NLRB v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, 210 F.2d at 503.
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and eliminated any interference with that goal by preventing unions
from asserting false claims of representation."
C. The Board Narrows the Scope of the Midwest Piping Doctrine
1. RCA Del Caribe
In light of the courts' opposition to the Board's application of
Midwest Piping, the Board narrowed the Midwest Piping doctrine."
In RCA Del Caribe, the Board established the policy that an employer
may not cease bargaining with an incumbent union in response to a
rival union filing a representation petition with the NLRB 2.5  The
employer and the incumbent union attempted unsuccessfully to
renegotiate a collective bargaining agreement. 3 The employees then
went on strike to demonstrate their support for the incumbent union's
bargaining position. 4 While the employees were on strike, a rival
union petitioned the Board for certification." In response, the
employer refused to negotiate an agreement with the incumbent
union until the union presented the employer with signatures from a
majority of the employees that authorized it to negotiate on their
behalf. 6 The employer was then charged with section 8(a)(1),57
50. Plavskool, 477 F.2d at 70.
51. In Bruckner Nursing Home, the Board stated that "fit had] reviewed the Board's
experience with Midwest Piping with a desire to accommodate the view of the courts of appeals
in light of [its] statutory mandate to protect employees' freedom to select their bargaining
representatives and in harmony with [its] statutory mandate to encourage collective bargaining."
Bruckner Nursing Home. 262 N.L.R.B. at 957.
52. RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965. A union files a representation petition with the
NLRB when it wishes to be certified as the bargaining representative of the employees in the
bargaining unit. Id. Under § 9(cXl)(A) of the NLRA, the union must demonstrate that a
.substantial number of employees ... wish to be represented for collective bargaining." 29
US C. § 159(c)(1)XA). The Board interprets the "substantial number" standard as meaning at
least 30% of the employees within the bargaining unit. See Bruckner Nursing Home, 262
N L.RB at 957 n.14.
53. RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.RB. at 963-64.
54. Id. at 964.
55. Id.
56 Id. IBEW presented the employer with signatures of 157 of the 227 employees in the
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8(a)(2), 51 and 8(a)(3)59 violations.60
The Board held that an employer does not commit an unfair labor
practice when it bargains with an incumbent union despite a petition
for election by a rival union.' The Board noted that in such a
situation, an employer who refused to negotiate with the incumbent
union committed a section 8(a)(5)62 unfair labor practice. 63 The Board
observed, however, that if the rival union eventually won the
election, any collective bargaining agreement previously agreed upon
by the employees and incumbent union would be "null and void."'
The Board noted that an incumbent union deserved a
"presumption of majority status,"'65 and that the mere filing of a
petition should not defeat that presumption.66 The Board reasoned
that its new policy advanced the NLRA's goals of maintaining an
bargaining unit. The parties stipulated that the signatures were voluntary and not obtained
through coercion. Id.
57. See supra note 4 (discussing § 8(a)(1) of the Act).
58. See supra note 4 (discussing § 8(a)(2) of the Act).
59. See supra note 26 (discussing § 8(a)(3) of the Act).
60. RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 963-64.
61. Id. at 965. The vote in RCA Del Caribe was 3-2 with the two dissenting members
issuing strong opinions in support of the Midwest Piping doctrine. Id. at 966-69. See infra Part
LD (analyzing Chairman Van de Water's dissent in RCA Del Caribe).
62. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of[section 9(a)] of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
63. RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965.
64. Id. at 966.
65. Id. at 965.
66. Id. at 965. The Board stated that "[t]he recognition of the special status of an
incumbent union indicates a judgment that, having once achieved the mantle of exclusive
bargaining representative, a union ought not to be deterred from its representative functions
even though its majority status is under challenge." Id. One of the dissenting members of the
Board in RCA Del Caribe, Chairman Van de Water, argued that a presumption of majority
status provided the incumbent union with an unfair advantage and served as one of the major
reasons for the need for a strict neutrality rule. Id. at 967. Chairman Van de Water reasoned that
"[b]y such employer interference, the selection process of a bargaining representative is no
longer reserved to employees, as the Act intended and provided, but instead is tainted by the
employer's choice and ability to influence employees in matters that concern their
employment." Id See also infra Part LD (analyzing Chairman Van de Water's dissent).
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efficient collective bargaining process and protecting the rights of
employees to choose a bargaining representative without employer
interference.67 Accordingly, the Board held that the employer could
not withdraw from recognizing and negotiating with the incumbent
union if the employer had a "good-faith" belief that a majority of the
employees supported the incumbent union.68
2. Bruckner Nursing Home
The Board in Bruckner Nursing Home held that when two or more
unions attempted to organize employees in a particular bargaining
unit, an employer's duty of strict neutrality only surfaced when one
of the unions filed a representation petition with the NLRB.69 Two
rival unions, Locals 144 and 1115, began organizing campaigns at
the employer's workplace.7" Subsequently, Local 144 alerted the
employer that it possessed authorization cards that represented a
majority of the employees.7 Meanwhile, Local 1115 notified the
employer that it was gathering support from the employees and
requested that the employer refrain from recognizing any other
union.72 In addition, Local 1115 filed unfair labor practice charges
against the employer and Local 144.73 After the Board dismissed both
charges, the employer verified the cards and negotiated a collective
bargaining agreement with Local 144.74 Local 1115 responded by
67. RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965. The Board further commented that this
approach was the best way to ensure employee free choice because if the employer was forced
to cease negotiating with an incumbent union when a representation petition was filed, the
employees may interpret this withdrawal from the negotiations as either dissatisfaction with the
incumbent union or support for the rival union. Id.
68. Id. at965 n.13.
69. Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955, 957 (1982). See I HARDIN, supra note 5,
at 85-107 (discussing union organization and solicitation).
70 Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.RB. at 955.
71. Id,
72. Id.
73. Id. Local 1115 claimed that the employer and Local 144 violated §§ 8(a)(1) and
8(bXIXA) of the Act. Id.
74. ld.
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
316 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
filing additional unfair labor practice charges against the employer."
The Board, however, refused to find that the employer committed
an unfair labor practice.76 In the absence of a representation petition,
the Board held that the employer was free to recognize any union that
acquired legitimate support from a majority of its employees. "
Accordingly, a representation election petition became the "operative
event" for an employer's duty of strict neutrality. 78 Once the duty of
strict neutrality arose, however, the employer would have to end all
negotiations with either union until the Board certified the
appropriate union through an election.79
The Board reasoned that the major weakness of the Midwest
Piping doctrine was its failure to balance the NLRA's dual purposes
of ensuring the right of employees to freely select bargaining
representatives and achieving efficiency in the collective bargaining
process.8" The Board noted that a narrow reading of the Midwest
Piping doctrine satisfied both objectives of the Act but a broad
interpretation of the Midwest Piping doctrine unnecessarily delayed
the bargaining process.8' Moreover, the Board stated that refusing to
allow employers to negotiate with a union that demonstrated majority
support interfered with employees' reasonable expectations.82
75. Id.
76. Id. at 958.
77. Id. Legitimate support entails acquiring the support of employees without coercion or
through other illegal means. See 1 HARDIN, supra note 5, at 317-23.
78. Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. at 957.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 957.
82. Id. at 957-58. In Bruckner, the Board modified its holding in Midwest Piping that
authorization cards are an unreliable measurement of employee sentiment. Id. Rather, the Board
stated that an employer could recognize and bargain with a union that possessed authorization
cards from a majority of the employees as long as no other union filed a representation petition.
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3. Dresser Industries
Of the three cases that substantially affected the balance of power
between employers and employees, Dresser Industries had the most
direct impact on the 1995 NBA labor dispute. In Dresser Industries
the Board overruled the policy articulated in Telautograph"3 and held
that an employer could not cease negotiating or executing a collective
bargaining agreement with the incumbent union based solely because
the employees commenced the decertification process by filing a
petition with the NLRB. 4
The Board relied on its reasoning in RCA Del Caribe when it
stated that the mere filing of a decertification petition did not defeat
the incumbent union's "presumption of majority status."" Indeed, the
Board noted that the "preservation of the status quo" was the most
successful way to ensure employer neutrality.86
D. RCA Del Caribe: The Clairvoyant Dissent
One of the Board members, Chairman Van de Water, dissented in
RCA Del Caribe and predicted that the Board's decision would have
83. Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972). In Telautograph, the Board held that
the filing of a decertification petition by the employees in a bargaining unit constituted a real
question concerning representation. Id. at 892. Accordingly, the Board reasoned that the filing
of the petition triggered the employer's duty of strict neutrality and the employer was prohibited
from bargaining with the incumbent union. Id. In Telautograph, the employer and Local Union
No. 3 (Local Union) began negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 892-93. At
that time, one of the employees filed a decertification petition with the NLRB. Id. at 893.
Subsequently, the employer refused to continue bargaining with Local Union. Id In response,
Local Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the employer, claiming it refused to
bargain in violation of § 8(a)(5) of the Act. Id. at 893. In rejecting Local Union's argument the
Board held that the employer's actions were justified and found that the filing of a valid
decertification petition triggered the employer's duty of strict neutrality and prohibited the
employer from bargaining with the incumbent union. Id.
84. Dresser Indus., Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1088, 1089 (1982). Because the employer acted in
accordance with NLRB procedures under the rule articulated in Telautograph, the Board
declined to find the employer's actions unlawful. Id.
85. Id. (citing RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 965).
86. Id. For a further discussion of Telautograph and Dresser Industries, see Silverman,
supra note 16.
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serious ramifications on employees' section 7 rights.87 Chairman Van
de Water argued that employees' rights to freely choose bargaining
representatives are frustrated if an employer recognizes a union when
there is a legitimate question as to whether a majority of the
employees support that union.88 He reasoned that once employees are
aware that the employer prefers one union over another, the
employees are more likely to support the union favored by the
employer.89
Chairman Van de Water presented several scenarios to support his
argument. In a situation where the employer prefers to maintain a
bargaining relationship with the incumbent union, for example, it can
offer favorable terms to entice the employees to support the
incumbent union.90 On the other hand, the employer may wish to end
its relationship with the incumbent union and decide to bargain with
the rival union to signal its preference for the rival union.9' The
Chairman noted that in either situation the rule articulated by the
Board in RCA Del Caribe places employers in a position where they
can influence the selection of the bargaining representative by
manipulating employee sentiment.9' Chairman Van de Water noted
that adherence to the Midwest Piping doctrine in a broad form
eliminated the problem of employer manipulation because the
employer cannot support any union.93
II. THE NBA LABOR DISPUTE
A. The Facts
The facts of the 1995 NBA labor dispute provide an illustration of
the impact of a restricted Midwest Piping doctrine on employees'
87. RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.R.B. at 967 (Van de Water, member, dissenting).
88. Id
89. Id. at 967-68.
90. Id. at 968.
91. Id. at 967-68.
92. Id. at 968.
93. Id.
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section 7 rights. Labor unrest surfaced in the NBA after the collective
bargaining agreement between the players and owners expired in
June of 1994.9 In October of 1994, both sides agreed to a no-strike,
no-lockout arrangement, and continued their relationship without a
bargaining agreement.95 The success of the arrangement, however,
was short-lived. In June of 1995, in the middle of the NBA
championship finals, the team owners threatened to lockout the
players if the sides did not negotiate and execute a new agreement
before the end of the championship series.96 The parties, however,
were significantly divided over several issues. Because the parties
were deadlocked, both the owners and the players weighed their
options. The owners could lockout the players, 97 declare an
94. Actually, the seeds of the labor dispute originated in April of 1983 when the NBA
players accepted a salary cap and revenue sharing plan. See Mark Heisler, NBA Lockout Could
Run Into Next Season, FRESNO BEE, July 1, 1995, at El. A salary cap is a concept that limits the
total amount of money each team in the league can spend on its players. John Helyar, NBA 's
Longest Game: Owners vs. Players, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1995, at B10. Revenue sharing is
where the teams in the league evenly divide the income generated by the sport. Id. The
agreement between the team owners and players to implement a salary cap was the first of its
kind in professional sports. Mark Asher, NBA Might Lock Out Players After Final Playoff
Series Ends, WASH. POST, June 13, 1995, at El.
The agreement to implement a salary cap and revenue sharing plan led to labor problems in
the NBA when the league brought a declaratory judgment action against several of its players in
National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In Williams, the
league sought a declaratory judgment that the salary cap, the college draft, and the "right of first
refusal" did not violate federal antitrust laws. Id. at 1071. A right of first refusal allows a team
to match any offer made by another team to a player who has played fewer than four seasons
and who has not played out two contracts. Id. at 1073. In response, the players brought
counterclaims alleging that the policies directly violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 1071. In ruling
that the league's policies did not violate antitrust laws, the court relied on the non-statutory
labor exemption that provided antitrust immunity to the NBA as long as a collective bargaining
relationship existed between the league and the union. Id. at 1078.
95. See Asher, supra note 94, at El. Because the parties did not reach an agreement on the
vital issues after the bargaining agreement ended, the league had the option of locking out the
players while the players had the option of striking. Id. One of the reasons for the parties
entering into the no-strike, no-lockout agreement was the fear of suffering the negative fan
reaction that the National Hockey League and Major League Baseball received when they
canceled part of their respective seasons due to labor disputes. Id.
96. Asher, supra note 94, at El.
97. In American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,308-11 (1965), the Supreme Court
held that a temporary employer lockout of its employees did not constitute an unfair labor
practice if the lockout was in support of a "legitimate bargaining position." Id. at 310.
19971
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"impasse"98 in the negotiations,99 or accede to the demands of the
players."° The players, on the other hand, could either accept the
proposal offered by the team owners or go on strike.' Both sides,
however, elected to forego using their economic weapons0 2 and
continued to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement. 0 3
Nevertheless, problems quickly resurfaced once the NBA
championship ended. Some of the players' agents voiced their
Furthermore, the Court held that lockouts were not necessarily inconsistent with an employee's
right to strike or an employee's right to bargain collectively. Id. at 309-10.
In the NBA dispute, a lockout would have led to the cancellation of summer leagues and
teams would have been unable to trade players or sign free agents. See Mike Monroe, League,
Players Meet On Lockout, DENy. POST, June 13, 1995, at D1.
98. An impasse occurs "after good faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of
concluding an agreement." Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.RtB. 475, 478 (1967), enforced, 442
F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see 1 HARDIN, supra note 5, at 696-710 (discussing the effect of
impasse on the collective bargaining process). In Taft, the Board held that it considers several
factors relevant in making the determination whether the parties are at impasse. Taft, 163
N.L.R.B. at 478. These factors were "[tihe bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in
negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which
there is disagreement [and] the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of
negotiations." Id. See also 1 HARDIN, supra note 5, at 693 (recognizing that in declaring an
impasse, the Board considers the following factors: (1) whether the employees have gone on
strike, (2) the flexibility of the parties' positions, (3) the possibility of the continuation of
bargaining, (4) statements or understandings of the parties regarding the impasse, (5) employer
animus towards the union, (6) the nature and importance of the issues at hand and the extent of
the disagreement between the parties, (7) the parties' bargaining history, (8) the parties'
willingness to further discuss the issues, (9) the duration of time between bargaining sessions,
(10) the amount and length of the bargaining sessions, and (11) any other actions inconsistent
with an impasse).
99. Under NLRB rule, if an impasse actually existed, the owners could unilaterally impose
a salary cap on the players. See Taft, 163 N.L.R.B. at 478. NLRB policy indicates that after the
employer and union become deadlocked on an issue, the employer is permitted to make
"unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-impasse proposals." Id.
(footnote omitted). See GORMAN, supra note 19, at 445-50 for an in-depth look at the role of
the impasse in labor disputes.
100. See Asher, supra note 94, at El.
101. See id.
102. Economic weapons, such as strikes and lockouts, are legal methods by which one
party may attempt to persuade the opposing party to agree to various demands. See 1 HARDIN,
supra note 5, at 685-91.
103. In response to the parties' agreement to continue negotiating in good faith, the league
extended the no-lockout agreement with the players. See Mark Heisler, NBA, Union Agreement
Close, According to Stern Announcement, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at C6.
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concerns over the owners' proposed terms for the collective
bargaining agreement."° As the owners and the Players Association
moved closer to a new deal, the agents and some of the players
(dissidents or dissident players) threatened to block the agreement.'
The dissidents claimed that the union was not representing the
players' best interests."°  Shortly thereafter, several of the NBA's
marquee players began to sign and circulate decertification notices." 7
After gathering the support of other players, a faction of players
petitioned the NLRB for a decertification vote.0 8 Meanwhile, the
owners and the Players Association reached an agreement on a
tentative six-year collective bargaining agreement (C.B.A. I)."09
104. The agents' concerns rested on the Players Association's willingness to accept a hard
salary cap. See Helyar, supra note 94, at B10. The agents believed that such a cap restricted
player movement between teams and decreased the earning capacity of the players. Id.
Although the owners agreed to raise the salary cap while throwing in licensing fee money, the
agents believed that such concessions were "cosmetic." Id
105. See Players, Agents Want Negotiation Details; Group Reportedly Threatening to
Block New Labor Deal, S.F. ExAMINER, June 19, 1995, at D9. The agents and players claimed
that the union's executive director, Simon Gourdine, breached his obligation to the players by
failing to release the details of the negotiations. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Mark Asher, Big-Name NBA Players Seek Fast Break from Union, WASH. POST,
June 20, 1995, at Cl. The players included Michael Jordan, Patrick Ewing, Scottie Pippen,
Alonzo Mourning and Horace Grant. l As of June 19, the players reported that they possessed
signed decertification slips from 32 players, one-third of the 30% needed to petition the NLRB
for a decertification election. See Mark Heisler, NBA Union Director Draws Fire, L.A. TIMES,
June 20, 1995, at C7.
108. Seventeen players petitioned the NLRB for decertification. They claimed to have
decertification notices from 61 of the 324 players in the union. See Mark Asher, NBA Deal
Draws Near as Players Press Union; Agents Reportedly Still Pushing for Decertification,
WASH. POST, June 21, 1995, at C1.
109. See Mark Asher, NBA, Union, Reach Six-Year Agreement; But Players Petition NLRB
for Decertification, WASH. POST, June 22, 1995, at D1. A key element of the deal that angered
the dissident players was a luxury tax that forced teams to pay a fine to the league if teams
signed veteran players at more than a 10% raise. Id. Other terms of the bargaining agreement
included an increase in the salary cap, a rookie salary cap, clauses that prohibited players from
becoming free agents before the end of their contracts, a limit on the length of contracts for
veteran players, and a reduction in the number of rounds in the college draft. Id. The dissident
players and the agents disliked the agreement because they claimed its terms restricted player
freedom to move from team to team and also decreased the potential earnings of individual
players. Id.
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The events surrounding C.B.A. I resulted in the creation of two
factions of players with opposing agendas." ° While the dissident
players actively solicited players to sign decertification slips,"' the
union supporters endorsed the ratification of C.B.A. 1.112 In response
to the increasing number of dissident players, the player
representatives postponed the ratification vote."' Once the player
representatives postponed the vote, the dissident players delivered
decertification slips from 180 players (fifty percent of the total
number of players in the bargaining unit) to the team owners and the
Players Association.1 4 At the same time, after unsuccessful attempts
to negotiate a new deal with the Players Association, the owners
imposed a lockout on the players." 5
110. Seeid.
111. At this time, the number of dissident players had grown from 17 to 98. See Michael
Wilbon, Trouble from Within, WASH. POST, June 23, 1995, at D1. This also marked the
beginning of a heated internal war between the players who supported the union and those who
did not. Id.
112. See Mark Asher, NBA Players Step Up Effort to Nix Deal; Papers Filed Seeking
Dissolution of Union; Labor Leadership to Vote on Agreement Today, WASH. POST, June 23,
1995, at DI. In order to ratify the agreement, 21 of the 27 team representatives and a majority of
the 29 league board of governors needed to approve the deal. Id.
113. The agents claimed that on June 23, 1995, they collected signed decertification sheets
from over 50% of the players. See Murray Chass, Deal Dead; Hoop Dreams Now Nightmare,
VANCOUVER SUN, June 24, 1995, at A15. At a meeting of 40 players that same day, however,
some players emerged from the meeting proclaiming the end of the decertification movement.
Id. Despite all the decertification talk, the league's board of governors voted unanimously to
approve the deal. See Mark Asher, NBA Labor Accord Put On Hold; Players Postpone Vote
After Owners Ratify Deal, WASH. POST, June 24, 1995, at C 1.
114. See John Helyar, NBA Players Enlist Legal Team in Contract Battle, WALL ST. J.,
June 29, 1995, at B2. On this same day, seven players led by Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing
filed a class action antitrust suit against the NBA. See 7 Players Sue NBA, Calling Salary Cap
and Draft Illegal, COURIER J. (Louisville, Ky.), June 29, 1995, at ID. The players claimed that
the absence of a collective bargaining agreement removed the antitrust exemption from the
NBA. Id. Accordingly, the players claimed that the court could hear their claim that the salary
cap and the college draft violated the Sherman Act. Id.
115. See Mark Heisler, NBA Doesn't Hold Its Peace with Lockout, L.A. TIMES, July 1,
1995, at CI. The lockout signaled the first work stoppage in the history of the NBA. See Peter
May, NBA Calls a Lockout; Signings, Camps Affected in First Work Stoppage, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 1, 1995, at 61. Following the lockout, on July 11, 1995, a group of NBA players sought an
injunction against the lockout, claiming it violated antitrust laws. See NBA Players Group Asks
Court to End Lockout by League, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1995, at B2. In addition, the Players
Association and the dissident players began to campaign vigorously to gain support for their
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Despite the decertification petition and the lockout, the team
owners and the union continued to negotiate a new agreement until
bargaining sessions broke down in August of 1995."6 In response to
another failed attempt to negotiate a new deal, the Players
Association agreed to dissolve itself if it could not work out an
agreement with the owners by August 8, 1995."7 However, on
August 8, 1995, the sides reached another tentative collective
bargaining agreement (C.B.A. II)."18
respective side's agenda. See John Helyar, NBA Players Union, Dissidents Trade Charges in
Decertification Campaign, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1995, at B6. The dissidents claimed that the
Players Association and the NBA acted jointly against the players. Id. The Players Association
claimed that the dissidents engaged in a "campaign of disinformation." Id.
The Players Association's version of the situation lost credibility, however, when the
union's financial consultant resigned on July 25, 1995. See NBA Players' Consultant Resigns
over Analysis, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1995, at B8. The financial consultant claimed that the
union misrepresented certain financial figures in an effort to bolster the credibility of the
collective bargaining agreement Id. Meanwhile, the decertification movement claimed to
possess approximately 200 signatures supporting decertification of the union. See Hal Bock,
Players Challenge Lockout Disgruntled Ranks Swell, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 12, 1995, at
5D.
116. This time, negotiation talks ended when the Players Association refused to accept any
concessions in exchange for the league abandoning its desire to implement a luxury tax. See
Mark Asher, Labor Talks Cease; NBA Says Union Limits Negotiations, WASH. POST, Aug. 4,
1995, at FL. The luxury tax would have forced teams to pay a tax to the league whenever they
re-signed a free agent at a pay raise of more than 10%. Id. See also NBA: Tax, Salary-Cap
Dispute Hangs over Renewed Talks, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 26, 1995, at C2. The NLRB
decided that the decertification vote would be held by secret ballot in either August or
September. See NLRB Orders NBA Union to Vote by Secret Ballot, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995,
at A3. The NLRB further requested that the Minneapolis district court delay the players' lawsuit
to enjoin the lockout until the Board conducted the decertification vote. See NLRB Asks for
Delay in Antitrust Suit Against NBA, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 1, 1995. The NLRB
believed that the results of the vote would aid the court in its decision because the key elements
of the antitrust claim revolved around the representative status of the Players Association. Id.
117. See Mark Asher, NBA. Union Beat Deadlines with New Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
1995, at Cl. The effect of the union decertifying itself meant that the players could bring their
antitrust claim against the league because the exemption that protected the league from antitrust
claims would be removed. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
118. See Asher, supra note 117, at Cl. The key element to the agreement was that the
league would not implement the luxury tax. Id. Other terms of the deal included an increase in
the salary cap, an increase in the average salary of players, a rookie salary cap, a reduction in
the number of rounds in the college draft, an allowance for teams to use half of an injured
player's salary to sign another player, an allowance for teams to sign a player who completed
two years with the same team at double his salary, and a clause which allowed owners to
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Although C.B.A. II contained terms more favorable to the players
than C.B.A. I,119 the dissidents still pushed for decertification of the
union. 2 ' In addition, one player filed unfair labor practice charges
against the league.12' The player claimed that the league tried to
coerce the players into voting against decertification by threatening to
cancel the 1995-96 basketball season.122 As a result, a movement
commenced to establish a new union for players who opposed both
C.B.A. II and the incumbent union.'"
Most of the players voted at the decertification election. 124 At the
ballot box, the NLRB presented the players with two options: The
players could vote "yes" if they wanted the Players Association to
continue to represent their interests at the bargaining table or "no" if
they wished to decertify the union."z Under NLRB rule, if the players
voted to decertify the union, they would also be voting to reject
C.B.A. 1.126 Likewise, by voting yes, the players would be indirectly
renegotiate the agreement after three years if salaries exceeded a certain percentage of the
league's revenue. See Scott Howard-Cooper, NBA Makes Labor Deal at 11th Hour; Pro
Basketball: Last-Minute Agreement Doesn't Include Luxury Tax. It Still Has to be Ratified by
the Players, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at Cl.
119. The most important difference to the players between the two bargaining agreements
was the absence of a luxury tax in C.B.A. II. The dissident players and their agents felt the
luxury tax would have significantly reduced the players' earning potential. See supra note 109
(noting the terms of C.B.A. 1).
120. See Asher, supra note 117, at Cl.
121. See Murray Chass, NBA Players Head to Polls Today for Key Vote on Union,
Contract, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 30, 1995, at E3.
122. Id.
123. See Mark Asher, A New Hat in the NBA's Labor Ring, With Today's Final Vote,
King's Richmond Offers Another Option, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1995, at B2. Mitch Richmond
was the player who filed the unfair labor practice claim and who jump-started the movement for
a new union. Id. The problem with the movement was that C.B.A. II included several terms
favorable to the players. See Chass, supra note 121, at E3. As a result, the players were unlikely
to support the establishment of a new union or the decertification of the old union and risk
losing favorable bargaining terms. Id.
124. See Richard Justice, Players Conclude Voting on NBA Labor Contract; League
'Cautiously Optimistic'Agreement WillPass, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1995, at C7.
125. Id.
126. See id. If the players voted to decertify the Players Association, any agreement
reached between the league and the union would be void. See supra note 64 and accompanying
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voting to ratify the bargaining agreement.'27 In the end, the players
voted 226-134 against decertification"2 8 and both the player
representatives and the team owners ratified C.B.A. 11.129
B. Analysis
The facts of the NBA labor dispute exemplify precisely what
Chairman Van de Water a0 and several legal commentators131 feared:
the ability of employers to manipulate and control employees' choice
of bargaining representatives.'32 In the NBA dispute, the players
ended up with a collective bargaining agreement with which they
were satisfied but that satisfaction came at the expense of their
section 7 rights.3 3 The Board's decision in Dresser Industries
allowed the owners to negotiate with the union after the players filed
a decertification petition.'34 Yet, the same type of situation could
text.
127. It is important to note that the players were actually only voting yes or no to decertify.
See Murray Chass, NBA Owners Brace for Vote Results, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Ma.), Sept.
12, 1995, at 21. There was no express question whether the players wanted to ratify the
negotiated collective bargaining agreement. Id. Indeed, several players voiced their concern
over the fact that the NLRB did not hold a separate vote to ratify the collective bargaining
agreement. Id. The players could not vote to reject the union and at the same time keep the
collective bargaining agreement (C.B.A. I1). Id.
128. See John Helyar, NBA Players Reject Bid to Scrap Union as Faction Led by Jordan is
Defeated, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1995, at A4.
129. See Richard Justice and Mark Asher, Owners Approve Agreement, WASH. POST, Sept
16, 1995, at H8. The dissidents accepted the results of the vote and vowed to "reform" the
current union instead of challenging it. See Mark Asher, Labor Dispute Ends with No
Objections, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at D2.
130. See supra Part I.D for analysis of Chairman Van de Water's dissent in RCA Del
Caribe.
131. See supra note 16 for discussion of the criticism expressed by legal commentators of
the RCA Del Caribe, Bruckner Nursing Home, and Dresser Industries decisions.
132. The author's analysis of the NBA labor dispute is one interpretation of the events.
There are certainly other possibilities as to what the team owners and players were thinking at
the time.
133. One of the main purposes of the NLRA is to maintain employee free choice in
selecting their bargaining representatives. See supra note 3 (quoting § 7 of the Act).
134. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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occur in initial organizing situations' 35 and scenarios where an
outside union challenges the incumbent union.' 36
In the absence of the Dresser Industries decision, under the
Board's policy articulated in Telautograph, the team owners and the
league would have been required to assume a duty of strict neutrality
when the players filed a decertification petition. 137 Accordingly,
under the NBA labor dispute time frame, C.B.A. 11138 could not have
been executed. However, the owners were able to induce the players
into voting against decertification by altering the terms of the
collective bargaining agreements. Once the players realized that
C.B.A. II was much more favorable to them than C.B.A. I, the
decertification vote reflected that they had no intention of losing such
a favorable agreement. 13
9
Furthermore, by continuing to negotiate with the Players
Association, the owners apparently utilized a divide and conquer
approach. Because the dispute separated the players into two factions,
one side that endorsed the union while the other side supported
decertification, 40 the owners maintained division among the players
by manipulating the terms of the bargaining agreements. Indeed, by
offering favorable terms to the Players Association in C.B.A. II, the
owners satisfied the union supporters while angering the
decertification supporters.14  Consequently, the players were
distracted by internal squabbling instead of uniting against the team
owners. Furthermore, the owners probably realized that most players
135. See, e.g., Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 N.L.R.B. 955 (1982). See supra Part I.C.2 for
discussion ofBrucknerNursingHome.
136. See, e.g., RCA Del Caribe, 262 N.L.t.B. 963 (1982). See supra Part I.C.1 for analysis
of RCA Del Caribe.
137. See Telautograph Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 892 (1972). See supra note 83 for discussion of
Telautograph.
138. See supra note 118 (discussing C.B.A. II).
139. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (noting the results of the
decertification vote).
140. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (recognizing the internal war that
developed among the players).
141. See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
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cared more about the bargaining agreement itself than about which
union negotiated the agreement. Thus, the owners eliminated the
terms the players would never agree upon and added a few favorable
terms to C.B.A. II to satisfy the players. The owners surely
anticipated that this strategy would result in a majority of the players
voting against decertification.
In the end, the owners achieved exactly what they wanted most:
player support for the Players Association. In addition, the owners
managed to retain a union that exerted little bargaining pressure on
them. So, although the players obtained a collective bargaining
agreement with which they were satisfied, it was achieved at the
expense of their section 7 rights.142
III. WHAT ABOUT EMPLOYEE'S SECTION 7 RIGHTS? A PROPOSAL
FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROAD STRICT NEUTRALITY
RULE
More than fourteen years after the Board re-evaluated the Midwest
Piping doctrine, the 1995 NBA labor dispute presents a clear-cut
example of the need to revert back to a broad strict neutrality rule.
Prior to narrowing the scope of the Midwest Piping doctrine, the
Board broadly interpreted the question concerning representation
standard to prevent employer interference, coercion, and
manipulation of employees' section 7 rights.143 In reconsidering the
question concerning representation standard, however, the Board and
the courts decided that there was a need to emphasize the NLRA's
goal of efficiency in collective bargaining.'" The problem is that the
142. The conclusion that the players would probably have voted to decertify the Players
Association in the absence of the favorable C.B.A. H is strengthened by the fact that the player
representatives voted out Simon Gourdine, the executive director of the Players Association, in
January of 1996. See John Helyar, The Hoop Players' Dream: A Leader to Rebuild Union,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1996, at 139. The action by the player representatives to vote out Simon
Gourdine exemplified the players' overall dissatisfaction with the union leadership. Id.
143. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (noting the rationale behind the Board's
decision in Midwest Piping).
144. See supra Part I (analyzing the courts' approach to the Midwest Piping doctrine and
the Board's approach in RCA Del Caribe, Bruckner Nursing Home, and Dresser Industries).
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Board has given the goal of efficiency priority over employees' right
to freely choose bargaining representatives.'45
To resolve the imbalance created by the Board's current policy,
there must be a return to a broad interpretation of the Midwest Piping
doctrine.'46  The following four section proposal cures the
shortcomings of RCA Del Caribe, Bruckner Nursing Home, and
Dresser Industries and ensures the protection of employees' section 7
rights in recognitional dispute situations.
47
I. In an initial organizing situation, where there is no
incumbent union, an employer's duty of strict neutrality arises upon
notice that one or more unions are attempting to organize its
employees. 41 In such a scenario, an employer's right to negotiate
with any union arises only after the NLRB certifies one of the unions
as the employees' bargaining representative.
II. In an incumbent union situation, an employer's duty of
strict neutrality arises upon a rival union petitioning the Board for an
election, even where the incumbent union demonstrates majority
support of the employees. 49 An employer's right to negotiate with
any union in an incumbent union situation does not arise until after
the Board certifies one of the unions as the employees' bargaining
representative.
III. The filing of a decertification petition automatically triggers
an employer's duty of strict neutrality. 5 ' Until the decertification
vote is held, the employer cannot negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement with any union.
IV. A rival union's claim to representation or its filing of a
145. See Margulies, supra note 16, at 88-89.
146. Although the 1995 NBA labor dispute is an excellent example of the need for a broad
strict neutrality rule, commentators have advocated this change since the Board narrowed the
Midwest Piping doctrine. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 16, at 103; Laplante, supra note 16, at
985-86.
147. The proposal is listed in the manner in which it could appear if added to the NLRA.
148. Section I of the proposal would overrule Bruckner Nursing Home.
149. Section II of the proposal would overrule RCA Del Caribe.
150. Section III of the proposal would reinstate the rule articulated in Telautograph and
overrule Dresser Industries.
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representation petition does not trigger an employer's duty of strict
neutrality in situations where there is a contract bar, a certification
bar, or where an inappropriate bargaining unit is involved.'
This proposal can be implemented in two ways. First, Congress
could amend the NLRA and include the four sections following
section 7 of the Act.' Second, the Board, with the support of the
courts, could implement such a strict neutrality rule through its
decisions.' Either way, the proposal completely insulates
employees' section 7 rights. The Board should recognize that
employees must internally resolve concerns about the status of their
bargaining representative amongst themselves. Allowing employers
to become involved creates the potential for manipulation and
coercion of employee free choice.'54
If the strict neutrality rule outlined above was in place during the
NBA labor dispute, section III would have triggered the owners' duty
of strict neutrality once the players filed a decertification petition.
Accordingly, the owners and the Players Association would not have
been able to negotiate the new collective bargaining agreement. Thus,
the players would have held the decertification vote without the risk
of losing a popular collective bargaining agreement.' 5
Although the effect of the proposal may cause some delay in the
151 Section IV of the proposal merely reiterates the Board's rule stated in Shea Chemical.
See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text for discussion of Shea Chemical.
152. An appropriate caption immediately after § 7 would read: "To ensure absolute
protection of the rights of employees to self-organize and freely choose their bargaining
representative, the following provisions apply to employers' conduct in recognitional labor
disputes." The four-part proposal would then follow. See supra note 3 for § 7 of the Act.
153, This route may be slightly more complicated because the Board and the courts would
have to overrule current case law piece by piece. In other words, to address each section of the
proposal, the Board and the courts would have to wait until cases with the appropriate fact
patterns reached them before they could rule.
154. See supra Part fl.B for discussion of the employer coercion of employee free choice in
the 1995 NBA labor dispute.
155. It is, of course, impossible to predict what the outcome would have been in this
scenario, The author believes that the players would have voted to decertify the union. This
theory is based on the notion that the players were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the
union until the emergence of C.B.A. Hl. See supra notes 111-14.
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collective bargaining process,'56 the NBA labor dispute illustrates that
a delay may be necessary to ensure the protection of employees'
section 7 rights. It is not necessary to speed up the bargaining process
to achieve the Act's goal of maintaining efficient collective
bargaining. Indeed, efficient and effective collective bargaining
cannot occur when an employer negotiates with a union chosen by
employees under coercive circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Under the NLRB's current analysis of the Midwest Piping
doctrine, employers have the power to legally infringe upon
employees' section 7 rights. Without the adoption of a broad strict
neutrality rule, situations like the 1995 NBA labor dispute will
continue to occur. Accordingly, to protect the rights of employees to
freely choose their bargaining representative, it is time to revert back
to the good old days, a time when employers could not use their
bargaining leverage to violate employee section 7 rights.
Mark S. Levine'"
156. There will always be a constant conflict between the need to protect employees' § 7
rights and the desire to prevent delay in collective bargaining. Because there are situations
where the results of a representation election are predetermined (this is the case because only
30% of the employees are needed to petition the Board for an election but over 50% are needed
to elect the union), it may be unfair to proscribe employers from negotiating a collective
bargaining agreement with a union destined to win the election. The 1995 NBA labor dispute,
however, illustrates that the delay may be inevitable to protect employee § 7 rights.
** J.D. 1997, Washington University.
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